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JUDGE STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS: This is the panel on
Competition Policy in the Telecommunications Space. We have
two commissioners, from the Federal Trade Commission and the
Federal Communications Commission. We have a professor,
Professor Yoo of Pennsylvania and Gene Kimmelman, President of
Public Knowledge. They are lined up in the sequence that they
agreed on to speak, and some may speak from their chairs and
some may speak from here. The hope is that they will speak
somewhere between five to ten minutes each, leaving us plenty of
time for internecine warfare and questions from you.
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: Thank you, Judge, and
thank you to the Federalist Society for having me. I’m delighted to
be here to talk to you about net neutrality, one of my favorite
topics, as well as how the FTC and the antitrust law and the
consumer protection law should all fit together in this space. I’m
currently a commissioner at the Federal Trade Commission but
my prior experience as the head of the Internet Access Task Force
at the FTC, which issued a report on broadband connectivity
competition policy in 2007, actually has, in some ways, much more
relevance to this topic.
And as I think about these issues, about competition in the
telecommunications space, a couple of antitrust related questions
come to mind. What are the tools that antitrust can bring to bear
for the kinds of concerns that people are raising in this area, about
lack of competition, about foreclosure, about the ability of a
gatekeeper to prevent other competitors in the marketplace or to
reduce consumer choice? I think the FTC has two very useful tools
that it can bring to bear on these kinds of issues. First of all,
antitrust enforcement. The FTC and the Department of Justice
have long brought enforcement actions against companies who are
engaging in anticompetitive practices or conduct, including the
telecommunications space. I will note the FTC has a common
carrier exemption and I’ll return to that, so our authority has been
limited to reach certain players in the market.
What are some of the benefits that an antitrust approach can
bring to addressing these kinds of competitive and consumer
concerns in the telecommunications market? First of all, I think
we can give businesses and consumers predictability, reliability,
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and transparency in carrying out our enforcement mission.
Antitrust issues have been long explored. They’re very heavily
influenced by economics and overseen by the court system. There’s
a lot of scholarly research in this area.
I think there’s also a very good track record of a fairly quick
resolution. I don’t think the AT&T breakup, necessarily, is a good
example of that. That went on a very long time, but perhaps
because there was a very regulatory approach to the breakup. But
I do think antitrust can generally offer a quicker solution.
One of the other benefits is expertise and procedural tools to
develop an extensive factual record quickly and efficiently. We
ask, is there a harm occurring in the market or likely to occur in
the market? It’s a very fact-based and very fact-specific inquiry. I
think one of the real challenges with prescriptive regulation that’s
forward-looking is a knowledge problem. Hayek would talk about
it in those terms. Does the enforcer or the regulator have the
necessary information at hand about what’s really occurring in the
marketplace? It’s very hard to predict the future. It’s very hard to
foresee problems that may arise or good things that an overly
restrictive approach might prevent. So a fact-specific, case-by-case
enforcement method, I think, has great advantages.
One of the other benefits of an antitrust approach is the
emphasis on economics. That’s a very, very important part of
antitrust analysis these days. The broadband market is a twosided market. What does that mean? What is the impact that that
may have? Two-sided markets are very hot these days. Jean Tirole
won the Nobel Prize in Economics for his observations on this
topic. But what is so important about two-sided markets that
requires proceeding with care? Whatever solution or restriction is
adopted on one side of the market can have important effects on
the other side of the market, and if you don’t understand how
these two sides of the market are interrelated restrictions might,
on balance, make consumers worse off.
The second relevant tool the FTC has is our consumer
protection authority. You may be aware that the FTC recently
brought an enforcement action against AT&T. It’s in active
litigation so I’ll just tell you what was said in the complaint.
AT&T had promised unlimited access to some of its wireless
Internet subscribers, yet it throttled the access for some of those
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subscribers. The FTC brought a consumer protection action based
on our deception authority, and also on our unfairness authority,
but primarily our deception authority, saying that if a company
has promised a certain level of broadband service and they don’t
provide that level, that’s a fairly straightforward consumer
protection violation that the FTC can challenge.
So to bring this all back to some of the debate that’s going on
today about net neutrality, there is one issue that I want to bring
to the fore because it hasn’t gotten that much attention. The FTC
has a common carrier exemption, so we can’t bring an enforcement
action against a common carrier providing common carrier
services. Right now, broadband is not classified as a common
carrier service, so, for example, we were able to bring the action I
just mentioned against AT&T. If broadband is reclassified as a
Title II service, that is very likely to oust the FTC’s jurisdiction
over these kinds of practices.
I’m concerned about that. I’m concerned about it on the
consumer protection side as well as on the antitrust side. For
example, the previous open Internet order upheld by the D.C.
Circuit includes a transparency requirement, so broadband
providers right now have to give consumers information about
how they manage traffic. That’s a promise that they make to
consumers. If they don’t adhere to that promise, right now the
FTC could bring an enforcement action against them, much like
we brought one against AT&T in the throttling case.
Thus one of the concerns that I have is losing the ability of
the FTC to act as an enforcer on both the antitrust and the
consumer protection side. If we pursue some other values through
a regulatory approach, does losing the FTC’s authority to act in
this area, on balance, make consumers better off? Given our active
enforcement, and given the tools that we have to protect
consumers on both the antitrust and the consumer protection
front, I have my doubts.
So I’ll stop there and look forward to the debate.
[Applause.]
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MICHAEL O’RIELLY: Well, thank you so much. I hope you
will forgive me. I am going to stay tied to my written script. Given
the sensitivities of everything happening right now, I think it’s
best if I don’t go off the cuff with anything being said. So I hope
you’ll forgive me on that point and I’m happy to answer any
questions as we go along.
I want to start by thanking the Federalist Society for having
me and the opportunity to participate with such distinguished
guests. Before I begin, I should mention that I intend to keep my
comments rather general, so as not to address any particular item
or situation presently before the Federal Communications
Commission. Moreover, as a practice, I do not publicly comment
on pending or potential mergers, so if people have questions on
those issues, I’m bound to punt on them later on.
Similar to our fellow agency, as ably represented by my good
friend, Commissioner Ohlhausen, part of the Federal
Communications Commission’s mission is focused on competition.
In particular, the Commission focuses on competition within the
telecommunications space, and, more broadly, the overall
communication marketplace. Unlike the FTC, however, the FCC
has a much different regulatory paradigm, resulting from a vastly
different statutory construct. Practitioners of communication
policy know that almost all authority provided by Congress to the
FCC is contained in the Communications Act of 1934. From this
statute, the Commission is structured to be a proactive oversight
agency as opposed to adhering to an antitrust model. For good or
bad, this means that the provisions in the statute provide the
Commission with authority to respond to circumstances or
conditions in the market, or to preempt circumstances that may
happen.
From a historical perspective, the concepts of competitive
markets and competition within the communication space are a
relatively new phenomenon in the life of communications policy. It
is only within the last thirty years of the overall 130 year-or-so
history that today’s vision of competition, rather than monopolycreated policy, has garnered the focus and attention of legislators
and regulators. This emphasis was solidified as one of the
cornerstones of the landmark Telecommunications Act of 1996,
which enacted a number of deregulatory measures and operated
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numerous market segments to competitive forces where only
government-sanctioned monopolies previously existed. By
rejecting artificial monopolies and embracing competition, the
Telecommunications Act also provided the Commission with
authority to prevent some private actors from engaging in certain
practices that would harm competition.
Separately, the Commission often uses its long-standing
merger authority to consider and impose conditions on parties to
transactions, regulate couching of these conditions under a procompetitive banner. These statutory provisions, including Section
214(a) and 310(d), authorize the Commission to approve or reject
the transfer of communications licenses between parties. In order
to obtain Commission approval to complete a merger or a licensed
sale, the parties traditionally have been required to show how a
particular transfer would meet the so-called public interest, which
has proven over time to be a moving, subjective target.
To be clear, competition-related provisions in the statute do
not necessarily always induce additional regulations but can lead
to the deregulatory actions as well. For instance, Section 10 of the
Communications Act, as added by the Telecommunications Act,
and establishes a forbearance process to exclude any regulation
from applying to a particular carrier or a telecommunications
service or class thereof, under certain conditions. In fact, in
considering whether to approve a forbearance petition, the
Commission is required to consider whether doing so will promote
competitive market conditions, including the extent to which such
forbearance will enhance competition among providers of
telecommunications services.
There have been multiple debates and criticism over the
application of this provision by the Commission since its
enactment. Recently, the Commission determinations have
effectively narrowed the existing forbearance authority and
expanded the scrutiny of most applications, to the point of
undermining its utility. Overall, the exercise of the Commission’s
authority is subject to findings about the conditions in the
marketplace. Since the advent of competition-centered policy, the
Commission has tended to refrain from imposing new regulations
or to withdraw existing regulations where a market or market
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segment is competitive; that is, there has been an inverse
relationship between competition and regulation. As competition
within a communication market segment increases, the necessity
of regulation decreases, and consumers, whether commercial or
retail, are able to move to other providers for the same or similar
product or service. This light-tough regulatory approach has been
the relative norm for a number of years and helped produce a
sound economic growth generated by the communications
industry. Lately, however, the Commission seemed to be turning
its back on this approach by imposing regulations even in
competitive markets. In general, many of the communications
market segments in the United States are experiencing fairly
significant levels of competition. While critics always seek more,
this must be balanced with the high capital and labor costs
required in this sector to operate and compete effectively.
The limitations of the Commission’s statutory oversight
authority arguably rest at the front door of the Internet. Despite
what some people suggest, the statute provides limited authority
to the Commission to oversee or regulate the Internet backbone
networks for applications and services. Accordingly, the
Commission has declined in the past to subsume the Internet in
the bowels of the Communications Act. Recently, I’ve started to
see the prior decisions, the ones that have allowed the Internet to
flourish absent government mandates and involvement, become
the subject of the Commission’s rethinking process.
I am a fervent believer of competitive forces, instead of
imposing regulatory mandates or burdens. Whereas real, stable
and lasting competition can tend to lead to lower prices for
consumers, increased economic efficiencies, greater productivity,
and advances in product and service offerings, regulations carry
with them added costs, unintended and sometimes unforeseen
consequences, lost productivity, and dead weight. Moreover,
regulations interfere with the free market system, steering
consumers and providers in directions that can be detrimental to
innovation and the development of future marketplace. It is not an
understatement to acknowledge that each regulation changes the
path of communications history by some degree.
I find the argument that you cannot have initial competition
without the imposition of regulation to be completely fictitious.
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Think of the multiple Internet e-mail and text offerings that
compete today, without the imposition of any direct regulation. I
also subscribe to the premise that government entities do not
actually create markets or competition, except in the extremely
problematic event, when a government enters the field as a
participant. Even in the most positive light, governments can, at
best, create an atmosphere or an environment for competition by
private entities, who are willing to put capital at risk, put their
financial future at risk, put their employees’ future at risk, and
much more, to generate a product or service. Detrimentally, some
governments, however, exert their power to bolster existing
market players, often under the guise of preserving competition
for market forces, such as bankruptcy, liquidation, or
consolidation.
With that framework outlined, I’m prepared to cede podium
to the next presenter.
[Applause.]

PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: I’m delighted to be
here, and I thank Judge Williams for doing such a great job and
for Commissioners Ohlhausen and O’Rielly for setting up this
discussion so well. I would like to take the conversation in a
slightly different direction. I would like to present some data on
competition. Policymaking is at its best when it is based on a solid
factual foundation. In the absence of data, people are free to base
their arguments on their personal preferences or their business
interests so long as they are theoretically plausible. Absent data,
advocates can base their positions on anything that might happen
instead of focusing more narrowly on the more important context
of what is actually happening.
I will offer one fairly standard caveat: No data collection
methodology is perfect. There is always some degree of
incompleteness or inconsistency in the data. The solution is to
acknowledge the limitations of the data and interpret it with those
limitations in mind. The alternative would be not to rely on any
data and to base policy on conjecture. One of the strengths of the
data on which I am relying is that almost all of it was collected by
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the EU government or by the U.S. government, specifically the
FCC and the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA). That means that the data was collected
through a process that was subjected to extensive public scrutiny
and comment and was analyzed by public servants doing their
best to promote the public interest. Indeed, many of the objections
to these data were actually raised during the collection process
and rejected. So even if there are people who would disagree with
the result, I don’t think we can attribute that to bad faith or
special interests. These data were collected by government
officials attempting to do their job as well as they could.
The conventional wisdom is that broadband service is a fixedline duopoly. I have two qualms with that characterization. The
first is that there is growing evidence that for many Americans,
wireless is beginning to supplant fixed-line broadband service.
Almost every projection has fixed-line service remaining flat both
in terms of the number of subscribers and utilization, while
wireless subscribership and utilization are projected to increase
steadily. The technical community is working on a variety of ways
to meet this demand, by retiring 2G spectrum during the 3G-to-4G
transition, repurposing other spectrum bands that are not in
heavy demand, and by deploying more cell towers operating at
lower power. Others argue that there is not enough spectrum to
permit wireless to completely replace fixed-line service. Rather
than resolve this argument, I will present data that consider
fixed-line service by itself as well as data that consider both fixedline and wireless service together.
The first set of data that I am going to show you are collected
by the FCC (Figure 1). The FCC has collected data semiannually
on the number of providers offering service in every census tract
in the U.S. The agency uses that data to calculate the percentage
of U.S. households located in census tracts that enjoy broadband
service, as well as the number of competitive options each of them
enjoy. These data have the advantage of having been collected for
the longest amount of time, so they are the best at showing trends.
Although the FCC collects data on 3 Mbps, 6 Mbps, and 10 Mbps
service, I will focus on the fastest tier, which is sufficient for most
uses except for video.
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Figure 1: Percentage of Households Served by Three or
More Broadband Providers, FCC Census Tract Data

Source: FCC

What we see is that through 2011, the level of competition
was relatively low, with only 3 percent of U.S. households being
located in census tracts served by three or more providers. That
situation begins to change dramatically in late 2011, reaching 93
percent by the end of 2013, which is the last year for which the
FCC has collected data. Even if one considers only fixed-line
broadband, by the end of 2013, 65 percent of American households
were located in census tracts served by three or more providers. So
casual assertions that broadband represents a duopoly in the U.S.
is not fully supported by the FCC’s data.
This conclusion is subject to a number of caveats resulting
from the limitations of the data. One well-recognized limitation is
that under the FCC’s methodology, a census tract is considered
served by a provider if a single household within it can receive
service from that provider. The problem is that some census tracts
are quite large, so large that the fact that one household can
receive service often says little about whether other households
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located in the same census tract can also receive service. The
result is that the FCC’s methodology likely overstates the actual
percentage of households receiving 10 Mbps service from three or
more providers. While this criticism raises questions about the
accuracy of the absolute coverage numbers reported by the FCC, it
does not undercut the overall trend in broadband coverage, which
is towards greater competition.
In addition, the NTIA has also collected data about the
percentage of U.S. households with three or more competitive
options for fixed-line broadband (Figure 2). Unlike the FCC data,
which collects data by census tract, a geographic area slightly
smaller than a ZIP code, the NTIA collects data by the smallest
standard unit collected by any U.S. government agency, known as
the census block, which is the rough equivalent of a city block.
Unlike the FCC, which disaggregates coverage by speed tier, the
NTIA data simply reports coverage for a single basic tier of
service. These data suggest again that the market became more
competitive, with the number of households served by three or
more broadband providers increasing from 40 percent as of the
end of 2011 to 56 percent as of June 2014. What is striking,
however, is that the NTIA data on competitive have been largely
flat since June 2012, which means the positive trend identified in
the FCC data over this period is not reflected in the NTIA data.
These inconsistencies merit further investigation. At a minimum,
however, these data raise a serious question whether significant
portions of the U.S. can be properly characterized as broadband
duopolies and how long that will continue to be the case into the
future.
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Figure 2: Percentage of Households Served by Three or
More Wireline Broadband Providers, NTIA Census
Block Data

Source: NTIA

I am also conducting research comparing U.S. and European
broadband deployment. The project is motivated by articles I’ve
seen in the New York Times and other outlets claiming that the
U.S. is behind Europe and, therefore, that the U.S. should adopt
policies that are more like Europe’s, focusing on service-based
competition instead of facilities-based competition and subjecting
the Internet to the regulatory regime that governs the telephone
system. So Europe offers an interesting real-world comparison
showing what happens when the Internet under the regulatory
regime developed to govern the telephone system. If one compares
200 kbps, that is, first-generation DSL speeds, both the U.S. and
the EU have 99.5 percent coverage.
When one examines 25 Mbps speeds, which is the only other
tier for which both the U.S. and the EU have historically collected
data, the story is quite different (Figure 3). The data indicate that
Europe has been trailing the U.S. in terms of the number of
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households that have service for the last three years by pretty
significant margins.
Figure 3: Percentage of Households with 25 Mbps Service,
Total

Sources: EU; NTIA
The disparity becomes even starker in rural areas (Figure 4).
Whereas 25 Mbps service is available in 51 percent of U.S. rural
households as of the end of 2013, only 18 percent of European
rural households enjoyed that level of service.
The disparity is equally striking in the newest broadband
technologies: Fiber to the Home (FTTH) (Figure 5) and the fourthgeneration (4G) wireless broadband networks known as Long
Term Evolution (LTE) (Figure 6). The press often portrays Europe
as a leader in FTTH, but the data indicate that the U.S. is in fact
ahead of Europe in this regard.
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Figure 4: Percentage of Households with 25 Mbps
Service, Rural

Sources: EU;NTIA

Figure 5: Percentage of Households Served by Fiber to
the Home

Sources: EU;NTIA
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LTE has emerged as an important platform for broadband
service, with commercial studies indicating that leading U.S. LTE
providers deliver average download speeds of between 12.7 and
19.1 Mbps, with peak service reaching 72 to 100 Mbps.1 LTE
coverage in the U.S. has consistently exceeded that of Europe,
with multiple providers now offering LTE service on a nearly
nationwide basis.2

Figure 6: Percentage of Households Served by LTE

Sources: EU; FCC
What is equally interesting is the diversity of approaches
that different European countries have followed. Four of the
newest and poorest members of the EU—Lithuania, Latvia,
Estonia, and Romania—have the highest deployment levels of
FTTH. The reason was the poor state of their traditional
telephone networks, which placed these four countries among the
six worst countries in the EU in terms of basic DSL coverage.
Lacking a legacy infrastructure to leverage, these countries
needed to install a new infrastructure and naturally opted to
Sascha Segan, Fastest Mobile Networks 2015, PC MAG. (June 22, 2015),
Christopher. S. Yoo, Possible Paradigm Shifts in Broadband Policy, 9 I/S: J.L. &
POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 367, 384–86 (2014).
1
2
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install FTTH as the state-of-the-art high-capacity technology. All
four of these new member states were able to achieve rural NGA
coverage rates that exceeded the EU average, although their
national NGA coverage fell short of the EU average.
The more established European countries are also pursuing
different strategies and achieving quite different results.
Interestingly, two countries often identified as broadband leaders,
France and Sweden, have emphasized FTTH to the exclusion of all
other technologies. Interestingly, both countries consistently fall
in the bottom half of EU countries in terms of 25 Mbps coverage,
with France ranking 25th out of 28 EU states in 2012 and 2013
and with Sweden ranking 20th and 16th during the same time
period. Fiber-focused countries have faced particular challenges in
serving rural areas.
In contrast, Germany and the UK are largely foregoing FTTH
(with only 4 percent and 1 percent coverage respectively) and are
instead relying on VDSL to support 50 Mbps service to a larger
percentage of their population. Interestingly, a report by Analysys
Mason indicates that of the five largest EU states, Germany and
the UK are the only ones projected to exceed the average coverage
levels for Western Europe.3 The reality of limited resources
presents policymakers with a stark choice captured nicely by a
rhetorical question posed by an industry observer: “Is it better to
provide 75–100 Mbps to 80–90 percent of the population or 1 Gbps
to 10–20 percent of the population? Especially when that 10–20
percent is already enjoying faster speeds than the rest.”4
What explains the persistent advantage enjoyed by the U.S.?
The most likely explanation is the different policy approaches
taken on either side of the Atlantic. U.S. policy focuses on
promoting facilities-based competition, while European policy
3 ANALYSYS MASON, REPORT FOR BT: INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARK OF SUPERFAST
BROADBAND 8 fig. 3 (Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.analysysmason.com/PageFiles
/44401/Analysys_Mason_Superfast_broadband_benchmark_Nov2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7YU7-JQHN].
4 Teresa Mastrangelo, Is VDSL2 Vectoring Destroying the FTTH Business Case?,
BROADBAND TRENDS (July 29, 2013), https://broadbandtrends.wordpress.com
/2013/07/29/is-vdsl2-vectoring-destroying-the-ftth-business-case/ [https://perma.cc
/256T-W64C].
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generally emphasizes infrastructure sharing. Regression analysis
that takes advantage of the considerable policy heterogeneity
across Europe reveals that this difference in approach is strongly
correlated with broadband coverage. Indicators of infrastructure
sharing and service-based competition are statistically
significantly negatively correlated with 25 Mbps coverage.
Indicators of facilities-based competition are statistically
significantly positively correlated with 25 Mbps coverage.5
This conclusion is corroborated by direct measurements of
investment per household. Consistently, since 2007, U.S.
companies invested 2 to 2.5 times more per household in
broadband than did their European counterparts.6 Surprisingly,
EU telecommunications providers have seen their revenues
decline throughout this period despite increased utilization.
Moreover, the average U.S. household uses 50 to 60 percent more
bandwidth than the average European household.7 This
underscores the danger of relying exclusively on download speeds
as a measure of broadband quality. The engineering community
has long recognized that the better measure is the bandwidthdelay product, which is the download speed times utilization,
which reveals that U.S. users are getting significantly more value
from the Internet, which explains in part why they pay higher
prices for the highest-bandwidth services.
The last thing I would say is there remains a lingering
problem with adoption. Although 25 Mbps service is available in
85 percent of U.S. households, only 32 percent subscribe. Europe
exhibits the same pattern with 25 Mbps service being available in
62 percent of households and with only 15 percent of them
subscribing.8 This underscores the need for regulators to look at
more than just supply side considerations, such as pricing and
network build-out that have traditionally been the focus of
regulation. Data collected by the Pew Internet Study, UK

5 Christopher S. Yoo, U.S. vs. European Broadband Deployment: What Do the Data
Say? 9–12 (University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law and Economics
Research Paper No. 14-35 June 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2510854
[https://perma.cc/MPJ2-HC4R].
6
Id. at 13 fig.5.
7 Id. at 19.
8 Id. at 14–15.
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regulator Ofcom, and the European Commission indicate that
pricing and availability are not the primary obstacles to adoption.9
This finding is corroborated by a study conducted by two FCC
staffers and two people from a Kentucky-based organization called
Connected Nation that focuses on wiring rural communities. They
surveyed families from the roughly thirty percent of U.S.
households that do not subscribe to broadband in order to find out
why. This study revealed that two-thirds would not subscribe to
broadband even if it were free.10 Although many have attempted
to dismiss this fact as mere ignorance, those interested in
promoting broadband adoption must recognize the need to
complement supply-side strategies focusing on pricing and with
demand-side strategies that increase and demonstrate the value of
broadband.
These surveys underscore the need to value proposition.
Providers in other countries are pursuing novel approaches known
as zero-rating strategies, such as Facebook Zero and Twitter Zero,
that provide clear benefits to those who have not yet adopted
broadband.
[Applause.]

JUDGE STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS: Christopher talks twice
as fast as other people, so he should have been cut by 50 percent.
Gene.
GENE KIMMELMAN: Thank you, Judge. Thank you to the
Federalist Society for inviting me and to my colleagues for
engaging this afternoon. I’m going to present a slightly different
perspective that actually, I think, brings some of this together,
9 See European Commission Directorate-General for Communications Networks,
Content and Technology, Communications Committee, Working Document, Broadband
Lines in the EU: Situation at 1 July 2012, at 13 (2013), http://ec.europa.eu/
information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=1700 [https://perma.cc/
7GZU-2A4M]; OFCOM, COMMUNICATIONS MARKET REPORT 2013, at 368 (Aug. 1, 2013),
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/cmr/cmr13/2013_UK_CMR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LW7R-XZ98]; Kathryn Zickuhr, Who’s Not Online and Why, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.
pewinternet.org/2013/09/25/whos-not-online-and-why/ [https://perma.cc/RTZ7-B9D4].
10 Octavian Carare et al., The Willingness to Pay for Broadband of Non-Adopters in
the U.S.: Estimates from a Multi-State Survey, 30 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 19 (2015).
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and I recognize that Commissioner O’Rielly couldn’t speak to the
specific issues in front of the FCC and I’m going to try not to, as
well, so that we don’t have to ex parte this.
[Laughter.]

GENE KIMMELMAN: I think that there’s a lot of merit to
antitrust enforcement. I worked in the Justice Department in
antitrust and I think there’s just tremendous benefit to it, but not
to the exclusion of a lot of work that the Federal Communications
Commissions does in and around broadband policy, and then,
more specifically, net neutrality. My theme is that the critical
issue here is how to harmonize split jurisdiction appropriately as
Congress has directed to three agencies—DOJ, FTC, and the
FCC—to engage appropriately, whether it’s in a transactional
context or in the behavior of individual or multiple companies in
the marketplace.
The important issue is whether there can be consistency
between antitrust enforcement and FCC regulatory activity. I
believe there are ways to do it well and there are ways to do it not
so well. Each approach, as you’ve heard today, is thoroughly
engaged in competition analysis, under different statutory
guidance, but I see no reason why they cannot be generally
consistent and harmonious. For example, I think that in some
cases Commissioner Ohlhausen is right—you can have quick
antitrust enforcement. In some cases, it’s not so fast. It’s not just
the recent enforcement action against AT&T, but the FTC’s
Google investigation was quite lengthy and in Europe it’s still
going on. So there are issues in innovative markets where
technology is changing quickly, where you can look at pros and
cons of antitrust enforcement and pros and cons of a case-by-case
analysis. The benefit may be that you’re very fact specific. The
difficulty may be that if you are an innovator with a new service in
a garage, and you are having trouble getting access to the
Internet, or speeds, or quality, the time it takes to do the case-bycase analysis may not be beneficial to your ever reaching the
market or sustaining your business—which is not to say that
regulation is fast.
But one of the benefits of an appropriate structural
regulatory model might be to send very clear signals and very
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strong signals to the marketplace of what is acceptable behavior,
what is prohibited behavior, and how things in the middle could
be balanced. The important thing is that the signals to the
marketplace actually work effectively to indicate what behavior to
watch out for and what is almost invariably green-lighted. I’m not
sure the fact that something is a two-sided market changes the
matter that much if the regulatory process is being done
appropriately and thoughtfully, because surely it should consider
all the ramifications, not just to the user side but to the supply
side, in any regulatory paradigm.
I fully understand the need to worry about jurisdiction, and I
think that what we ought to be most concerned about, societally,
is that we’re not duplicating regulation and we’re not promoting
inconsistent rules and enforcement practices, but I’m not so sure it
matters whether it’s done at one agency or another if they’re
practicing sound policy and being very straightforward, and
subject to judicial review, as each of these agencies is.
I appreciate Commissioner O’Rielly highlighting the FCC
focus on competition. One thing has jumped out to me over the
years, in looking at the transactional side of this. Whether it’s
DOJ or the FTC, looking at mergers and acquisition, or the FCC,
is that in areas where there may be limited competition going in,
there are some interesting statutory limitations that can apply. If
you’re not dealing with a straight monopolization case in
antitrust, you might be looking at a market that is highly
concentrated, even possibly monopolistic, and the discussion with
the antitrust enforcement agency of overcharging consumers,
harming innovation, might be, is this transaction making it
worse?
That is the most likely conversation. And if it’s already
substantially bad and the market isn’t working competitively,
many times my colleagues in antitrust would say, “You have a
problem but it’s not our problem. Go over there.” For this industry,
“over there” is the FCC. Within the FCC’s statutory mandate,
however vague the public interest may be, Congress has
specifically directed the FCC to look to actually promote
competition, and that is something that can be difficult in some
instances, in pure antitrust enforcement.
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From my perspective, the ideal would be harmonizing the
tasks of the two functions within our government and making
sure that what is being done in antitrust enforcement is consistent
with what is being done in regulatory policy or reviewing
transactions and license transfers at the FCC. The FCC might
realistically be able to do something that can actually open a
market to more competition. I agree with Commissioner O’Rielly
that the goal should really be to seek competitive forces and not
use regulation as a tool or a surrogate for competition, where it
certainly doesn’t always promote competition.
However, then we get into the factual analysis. What does
the market look like? I think Professor Yoo’s data are
interesting—I’d like to review them. It does remind me a little bit
of the history in the early twentieth century, when we had a lot of
companies trying to come in and compete in what we call
telephone service. It didn’t really work economically. So I don’t
know if we’re hitting a plateau or if we’re on some great
ascendancy for broadband. I also would love to see your 10megabits numbers put into the 25-megabits range, just to see
what happens.
We just released a survey today at Public Knowledge, John
Horrigan did, looking at the different side of this, the consumer
attitudes. It is on our website and available, but the short
headline is that when we asked people, “Would you use wireless as
a substitute for wired-line broadband?” more than 90 percent said
no, and on the questions related to how easy or difficult it is to
switch broadband service, consumers were profoundly concerned
that it was not at all easy. There was an enormous amount of
stickiness, whether there is one other provider or two. There were
some important issues there on substitutability and how markets
really work, that I would love you to look at, in conjunction with
your data.
What we see right now, from my perspective, is that as much
as we would love competition and more players, there are
problems in broadband that do need public oversight. We ought to
be looking at how to use antitrust appropriately in conjunction
with communications policy oversight, and just make sure they
are consistent and truly harmonized. Thank you.
[Applause.]
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JUDGE STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS: Perhaps speakers
would like to take issue with each other.
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: I’m happy to start
off, just because Gene directed his last comment towards me. I
always appreciate talking with you, Gene, just because I think you
are very thoughtful. I find that a lot of times people talk past each
other in this space, and I think you have always been engaged and
constructive.
It is true that we saw a spate of voice competition once,
following the 1996 Act, that fell off. That was all based on the
infrastructure sharing model that Europe largely follows today,
and it wasn’t robust. It was all reselling someone else’s pipe. And
there are a lot of us who have been skeptical about that. Herb
Hovenkamp is a great author. It’s like saying are we going to have
competition for bananas within a grocery store? Are we going to
have all these banana carts running around the store? They all get
the same bananas from the same wholesale place in the back, the
same product, and all they’re doing is squeezing margin.
Frankly, if you have a monopoly pipe and, really, that’s all
you’re going to get, that’s not an unreasonable policy to adopt.
We’re in a different space now, where we’re having to make
investments. For voice, in particular, wireless—you’ve seen what’s
happened with fixed-line subscriptions. They’re dropping like a
stone and none of my students have them anymore. So one of the
things that we’ve understood in certainly the voice space, the
facilities-based competition ended up being a wonderful solution
that became much more robust.
I understand Gene’s skepticism about the future of wireless. I
do see a lot of numbers pointing that way. Interestingly, a survey
that was published and presented at TPRC said 11 percent of U.S.
households are now wireless-only for broadband. Some countries
in Europe are in excess of 20 percent. And if you look at the
numbers—well, I guess what I would say is it’s plausible to me
that this would happen, and I find so many people doing what I
think of as technologically determined views—oh, this can’t
happen, or this must happen.
And anyone who has followed this business long enough
knows that that’s a good way to go broke, because a lot of things
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that we thought were so sure—I mean, we talked about the
impeding fiber monopoly for a while, and then we talked about the
impending cable monopoly, and right now AT&T has upgraded to
VDSL and they’re taking subscribers away from cable. And,
actually, I think that’s what’s wonderful about this is we don’t
really know. I do see, actually, a lot of my students don’t have
fixed-line connections anymore and are relying exclusively on
wireless broadband. I always keep an eye on them because they’re
a trend of where things are going.
But my point is, one of the brilliant things of the U.S. policy
is we’re flexible. When I started in this business fifteen years ago,
AT&T was focusing on U-verse when Verizon was focusing on
FiOS. One of my students asked, “Isn’t AT&T being incredibly
shortsighted?” I replied, “Well, the great thing is we get to find
out.” We have an environment in which we have that kind of
experimentation, I think looking back what they would say is
Verizon doesn’t talk about FiOS anymore, and it costs 2-1/2 to 3
times more, or 3-1/2 times more. So it’s a wonderful experiment
that Europe is repeating.
Don’t get me wrong—I’m not trying to bash AT&T. Verizon
did the same bit on LTE when AT&T wasn’t ready to move and
got tremendous benefit out of that, but this is equity risk, people
putting their money on the table with major investments, and if it
pays off, that’s how we drive it forward, and I want people trying
to out-invest each other instead of trying to out-regulate each
other, by trying to get some regime where they’re trying to use the
system to get a legal advantage as opposed to something in the
marketplace.
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: I probably neglected to say
this at the beginning but I should say it now, which is that I do
only speak for myself and not the Federal Trade Commission.
[Laughter.]

MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: I do think the discussion
raises a couple of interesting issues. Gene, I think you’re right
that having a regulation in place is quicker and more certain than
a case-by-case enforcement approach, but I think you have to look
at Type 1 and Type 2 errors—what are the bad things you’re
preventing but also what are some of the good things that you
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may be preventing. My concern is that adopting a regulatory
model that freezes into place what the Internet looks like right
now, we don’t know what we’re missing out on. And I agree—
competition, I think, is the first line of defense for consumers in
telecommunications policy as well as everywhere else in the
economy, and I think we need to take a hard look at regulatory
proposals and ask will they lead to more competition in networks,
or will they limit how these networks can evolve? We’ve certainly
seen a lot of competition, a lot of innovation at the edge, and I
think that’s a good thing, but I think we need to think hard about
innovation and competition in the networks as well.
MICHAEL O’RIELLY: I’d be interested—if I understood,
Gene, and without talking about anything specific or inquisitive
item—
[Laughter.]

MICHAEL O’RIELLY: —if I understand your points, and I
took them very well, that consistency and harmonization between
the agencies that we represent is a good thing, and I wondered if
you couldn’t comment about the point that the Commissioner
made regarding the lack of authority, that if certain decisions are
made that the FTC would have no authority in some items, and
how does that fit with the consistency and harmonization if the
FTC has no authority in its space?
GENE KIMMELMAN: I would worry if nobody has
authority over something that’s as important as either something
directed by Congress or agencies to oversee, or something that we
just think is important for society, and agencies would at least be
cognizant of. So, in this regard, if broadband were a Title II
service—
MICHAEL O’RIELLY: Well, I didn’t really say that.
[Laughter.]

GENE KIMMELMAN: The FCC has Customer Proprietary
and Network Information authority to protect privacy. It has
authority under Title 6 over cable privacy issues, as well, so there
are a variety of things the FCC has. It would be interesting to look

2016]

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

803

and see what the actual dividing line would be. Again, the same
principle applies in antitrust, following the line of the Trinko case,
as an example. We’re very careful to make sure that antitrust isn’t
interfering with the regulatory regime. Using the same logic here,
again, to be consistent and harmonized, it’s important to make
sure that we have protections for consumers from one of the
agencies or the other and that certainly we don’t have both of
them going in the opposite directions. That’s my main point here.
But I’m pleased to see the FTC move on the AT&T question
of fairness in the presentation of its services. There are things the
FCC could do if the FTC weren’t doing them, and the important
thing is that there’s always an agency that can address an issue.
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: I support what the
FTC is doing. I do not think that anyone would dispute that people
should get what they have been promised. I also agree entirely
with Gene that reducing switching costs makes markets work
better. For example, number portability in the wireless space was
a tremendous success. There are other measures we could take
that would help reduce switching costs still further. What’s
fascinating in Europe, the inside wiring is almost always owned
by the incumbent provider. Some regulatory agencies are
experimenting with new ways to provide access to conduits and
other network elements that are currently not subject to
competition and are likely to be competitive in the foreseeable
future.
So I think that there is a room for new thinking, but I love
the idea of framing it in terms of reducing switching costs and
increasing competition in networks, as Commissioner Ohlhausen
said, which in turn directs the focus on those areas where we do
not have enough competition. Many metropolitan areas do have a
workable level of competition.
Another aspect of the debate that bothers me is that it is
primarily focused on preserving competition in content and
applications at the edge, which is the part of the industry that is
already very competitive and unprotected by entry barriers and
thus very likely to stay that way. Those advocating edge
innovation often wrap themselves in the rhetoric of protecting the
garage innovator. But a closer look reveals that the debate is
usually between large companies who are in a position to take
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care of themselves in any arm’s-length negotiation. Instead, the
debate should be reframed in terms of the real policy problem,
which is how to enhance competition and encourage investment in
last-mile networks.
JUDGE STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS: Questions from the
floor? It’s very hard for me to see, because the lights are coming
right at my eyes. But if you put your hand up and wave it, I
should be able to pick you out.
GENE KIMMELMAN: While you’re pondering, I want to
come back to Chris on the data issue. What I was referring to was
not really the 1996 Telecommunications Act but really the early
twentieth century, before the modern AT&T monopoly emerged.
We had a lot of phone companies. It didn’t really work. So there
are some fundamental economics here. I think you mentioned
economies and capital investment. There are obviously some big
issues here. How many competitors are we really going to get?
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: Actually, like any
good academic I have a standard answer—I have an article on
this.
[Laughter.]

PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: It came out in the
Texas Law Review.11 The conventional wisdom is that the U.S. has
always had a privately owned telephone system, in contrast with
the rest of the world where telephone service was traditionally
operated by governments. The conventional wisdom overlooks the
fact that the U.S. Postal Service took over the U.S. telephone
system for one year during World War I, a fact that has been
largely lost in history. And the big question is not why the
government took over the telephone system. The exigencies of
World War I had already led the federal government to take over
the radio system and the railroads, and Postmasters General had
been clamoring for such a takeover for fifty years. The question is
why the Federal Government gave it back.
11 Michael A. Janson & Christopher S. Yoo, The Wires Go to War: The U.S.
Experiment with Government Ownership of the Telephone System During World War I,
91 TEX. L. REV. 983 (2013).
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The government takeover of the telephone system followed
the early competitive era of the telephone industry. AT&T was
trying to replicate the business model used for the telegraph
system, which focused on connecting major business centers with
long-distance connections. The leaders of AT&T could not see why
anyone would want a telephone in their home and declined to
connect small towns, rural areas, and even suburban
neighborhoods of large cities. This left a green-field opportunity
for independent telephone companies to come in. AT&T also
concluded that farmers do not need telephones. As it turns out,
the fact that farmers were among the most isolated members of
society meant that they were among the people who wanted
phones the most. Farmers established service by connecting
telephone wires up to their barbed-wire fences and using that to
provide service to their houses. AT&T saw little potential in such
attempts because the low quality of those connections would not
support long-distance service. But 99 percent of connections were
local calls within twenty miles of your home. People simply did not
call long distance back then.
So what is fascinating is that the first quarter of the
twentieth century saw a robust competitive environment emerge
in the telephone industry. In 1907, AT&T undertook a clear
change in policy. Rather than try to compete with the
independents, AT&T attempted to merge to monopoly by
acquiring the independent telephone systems with which it was
competing. If the independent telephone system refused, AT&T
instead employed a classic division of markets, in which AT&T
agreed to withdraw from the independent telephone system’s
service area in return for a promise from the independent not to
expand outside that area. These represent two classic, blatantly
anti-competitive business practices that should have been blocked
by an antitrust enforcement authority. AT&T addressed concerns
that the withdrawal of competition would cause prices to go up by
agreeing to submit to rate regulation.
So competition was possible in the early telephone industry,
and competition died because the antitrust authorities did not
stop AT&T from employing well-known anticompetitive strategies,
not because the telephone system was a natural monopoly.
Ironically, monopoly was not the justification for regulation, as is
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commonly assumed. Regulation was instead the justification for
monopoly. Moreover, these dynamics provide a classic example of
a company using the political system and legal intervention to end
competition and stands as a warning about the dangers associated
with regulations designed to protect certain sectors of an industry
against another. I prefer the preregulatory world in which two
companies were racing to outbuild each other, as is happening to
some extent right now between cable companies, telephone
companies, and new entrants such as Google Fiber.
GENE KIMMELMAN: I think your story is right except one
of the problems is that those companies refused to interconnect
with each other. We could have possibly had a non-monopoly,
totally competitive system if they could have either had a
regulator just imposing meaningful interconnection rules or could
have figured it out in the marketplace themselves. That was an
important factor in play.
HOWARD LIM: Howard Lim, New York State Conservative
Party. This Administration seems to enjoy doing things by
executive order. In the area of net neutrality, if the Congress
wanted to go in one direction and the President wanted to go in
another, where does the ultimate authority lie?
MICHAEL O’RIELLY: I’m trying to be careful on my words
here. The FCC is an independent agency and it is a creature and
creation of Congress to implement the laws and the statutes
enacted by Congress. We will faithfully do that. That is my charge
and we’ll continue to do so. The President has an opportunity, and
does, and expresses his views from time to time, and Presidents do
on many different issues, not just in front of the FCC. So that’s
something we will certainly take into account, just like we would
take into account what comes from the Congress that’s not in the
form of a law.
GENE KIMMELMAN: There’s one thing that I think is
worth nothing. Within the law right now, any regulation can be
reviewed by Congress. There is actually a streamlined process for
that. So if the FCC did something that the Congress didn’t like, it
could reject it. That rejection would then go to the President who
would have to sign it as a bill or veto it, and then it would be the
question of whether the Congress would sustain or override that
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veto. So there is at least a process by which one would naturally
see a disagreement either worked out or just somehow resolved.
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: I’ll go even
farther. Agencies are creatures of Congress. They possess only the
authority given to them by Congress. The executive may have
direct authority over matters such as foreign affairs, national
security, military affairs, and the means necessary to make an
administration run, such as the removal power. But dictating
communications policy has never, to my knowledge, been asserted
to be within the prerogative authority of the President. I think
that a good court would be appropriately skeptical about
presidential attempts to regulate via executive order without
proper legislative authorization.
JUDGE STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS: The President, of
course, obviously has the power to appoint the commissioners,
initially, and I often read in the papers that if some hypothetical
commission does something that Congress doesn’t like, Congress
could respond by some kind of selective withdrawal of funds. I
guess my intuitive reaction to that is that if they did it as a little
stiletto, the President would pay no attention. If they wrapped it
together with something, then you enter into the sort of
bargaining position that we’ve seen an awful lot in the last few
years, the outcome of which is uncertain, at any rate. But I’d be
very interested in any reflections on that.
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: There’s been a
huge fight over the years about whether appropriations riders
interfere with the executive power. My favorite one arose during
the Administration of Lyndon Johnson, when Congress enacted an
appropriations prohibiting the President from closing the Naval
Academy’s dairy farm. Johnson quipped, “Thus the Congress,
which has given the Navy Department authority over the world’s
most powerful fleet, has withdrawn the Department’s authority
over 380 cows.”12 There is a sense in which such
micromanagement can be taken to absurd lengths, but the bottom
line is that the farm remained open. That’s the nature of politics.

12 STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 341 (2008).
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MICHAEL O’RIELLY: And it’s not just appropriations. Just
to give you a historical perspective, there used to be seven FCC
commissioners. There’s only five.
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: What happened to the other
two?
[Laughter.]

MICHAEL O’RIELLY: The spots were removed, not the
people. The people themselves are I’m sure living somewhere next
to the farm.
[Laughter.]

PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: But there is a
Supreme Court case called U.S. v. Lovett,13 where Congress
attempted to effect the removal of three agency officials suspected
of being “subversive” by enacting a statute providing that no
salary or compensation should be paid to these officials unless
they were reappointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. The Supreme Court struck down the
statute as an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder.
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: Speaking from a historical
perspective, back in the 1970s the FTC had done some work on
something called Kid-Vid, where it was going to restrict
advertising of sugared cereals, and Congress wasn’t happy about
that. And the number of tools that Congress can bring to bear on
an agency, when Congress is not happy, is quite remarkable. The
FTC was shut down. The people didn’t get salaries. The agency
staffing was reduced. There are a lot of tools that Congress can
use.
SAM MIORELLI: I’m Sam Miorelli. I’m from the Orlando
Lawyers Chapter. We hear a lot of the latest discussion is the
battles of the different types of technology—cable and whether we
should have net neutrality and all—and I’m wondering why we
haven’t heard more about how these different players mess with
the ultimate devices. Once upon a time, AT&T owned the phones
13

328 U.S. 303 (1946).
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and they regulated what the individual handset can do, and you
still see that in the mobile space. Verizon notoriously delays
Windows phone updates going out. AT&T notoriously delays
updates on Android going to Samsung devices longer than often
going to Google devices. And that really creates some large
dislocations using those large monopoly powers in the
marketplace for the end device, that as a consumer you have to
think eighteen months from now, will my device get treated like a
second- or third- or fourth-class citizen by the carrier, regardless
of what the device manufacturer tries to do?
I’m just wondering why it is we focus so much on the delivery
of the data and we don’t look at some of the broader issues, that it
doesn’t matter how good my pipe is if my phone crashes.
JUDGE STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS: Commissioner
Ohlhausen, do you want to take that? It seems like a competition
issue.
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: Sure. I guess the question
that I would have there is, how much of an incentive do the
networks actually have to do this. An individual consumer may
have just signed up for their phone, and has to wait until eighteen
months to switch. But the amount of switching that goes on every
month likely has a disciplining effect on the ability of one network,
one provider to disadvantage a different type of phone. So you
were saying that the one network had an incentive to—
ATTENDEE: [Speaking off mic.]
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: But how big a share of the
market of Verizon is Windows phones? I mean, Windows phones
have a very small market share, I believe.
ATTENDEE: Verizon has less control over what apps they
can put on Windows phones than they have on Android, and
there’s less market demand than there is for iPhones, so they
essentially triple a platform so they push customers into a
platform that they have more control over selling other services.
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: There are a lot of
complicated issues in this. Wireless ISPs regard Windows updates
as the biggest denial-of-service attack in the entire network—
[Laughter.]
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PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: —because they all
go on one night, and they sometimes overwhelm networks. So
wireless networks have to manage their networks, otherwise none
of those updates would get through. Moreover, we often forget how
heterogeneous wireless technologies are. People complained about
the original exclusivity deal between the Apple iPhone and AT&T.
AT&T’s wireless network employed a technology known as
HSPA+. Verizon and Sprint relied on a different technology
known as EVDO. Interestingly, the iPhone was easier to deploy on
HSPA+, and Apple had not worked out all the compatibility issue
with EVDO. So the decision to launch initially with AT&T was
driven in part by the technology. And what we are discovering is
that companies are continuing to experiment with different
designs that have can have a dramatic impact on the ecosystem.
The other consideration is that the network providers often
need to provide incentives to app providers to conserve bandwidth
and to manage the network to ensure the platform performs
properly. The essential security patches get priority over other
product features. Wireless companies also need to encourage apps
that are designed to conserve on bandwidth and attempt to work
with app providers to make sure the platform delivers what end
users really want, which is a safe phone, and updated in a timely
manner, and which supports a wide variety of apps.
You have to make some tradeoffs, and what you find is there
is often a very difficult negotiation about how different actors are
going to hand off data, when they are going to do so. All edge
providers do not cooperate to the same extent. Both sides have
interests in making their own lives as easy as possible. So what
looks like intransigence and discriminatory behavior from one side
may simply be a good faith disagreement over value or the normal
tug and pull of the bargaining process. Regulators are ill-suited to
resolve such disputes. My instinct would be to try to align
incentives so that people would not have as much instinct to hold
out or resort to legal resolution, to minimize the space of conflict.
ATTENDEE: Thank you. I came in late but some of the
earlier questions have given me the confidence to ask this. I’ll
address it Professor Yoo since you’re free to give an opinion.
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[Laughter.]

PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: I daresay Gene is
in the same position.
ATTENDEE: Well, this gets worse because I work in the
stock market, and I observed when President Obama made his
comments about net neutrality. I mean, whoa, it just crashed a
whole bunch of big stocks. That led me to attend this session and
wonder—and I believe I saw you on television for this, also, thank
you very much—what is your interpretation of what President
Obama was doing? I mean, does that funnel into something real
practical that he can put his hands on, or was he just making an
expression, do you think, of his desired policy for what he’d like to
see? It was quite mystifying. It certainly destabilized a whole
bunch of companies and a lot of thought as to what competition
policy currently is.
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: Before I answer
the direct question, the fact that your observation about the
market reaction actually, I think, is an important one, but many
people suggested that, “Oh, markets don’t care about this stuff.” It
matters, and, in fact, we should expect it to change stock prices.
I am not a mind-reader. Let me speculate. Senator,
Candidate, and President Obama repeatedly endorsed network
neutrality, and that position was popular with many of his
supporters. A political explanation might be that in a world in
which you are unlikely to get legislation through Congress,
playing to one’s political base may be an excellent strategy. There
are many Democratic members of Congress who are raising money
around the issue of network neutrality. And he may look at the
several million e-mails sent to the FCC and think there may be
some political advantages to endorsing such a large public
outpouring of sentiment. Another possibility is that the president
was attempting to provide cover for the FCC by making a
regulatory action that might have looked intrusive appear
moderate in comparison. And it could simply be that some people
in the White House studied the issue and concluded that on the
merits, Title II reclassification was the best legal approach.
At this point, it is not entirely clear how this issue is going to
play out because, as Commissioner O’Rielly points out, the FCC is
an independent agency, a point that Chairman Wheeler has
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reminded everyone about. I assume, in terms of the politics, that
the President’s remarks will make it more likely that the FCC will
reclassify broadband as a Title II service. At the risk of putting
Commissioner O’Rielly on the spot, I would note that there is a
division in the Commission, and it’s not entirely clear how the
Chairman is going to get to three votes on his preferred proposal. I
would say that the President’s announcement now makes
compromise even harder. So my guess is that if the President was
trying to get this as an outcome, and it is quite likely that the FCC
will embrace Title II.
JUDGE STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS: Unless someone has a
question, I have a question. Okay. Go ahead.
BERIN SZOKA: Berin Szoka, TechFreedom. Gene, a lot of
what’s driving this debate, a lot of the argument for Title II boils
down to this assertion that you made today that a 706 approach
isn’t workable to address concerns about discrimination because
the administration of it would be just too difficult, it would be too
burdensome for small providers. But there are many people—Hal
Singer, for example, of the Progressive Policy Institute—who have
called for an approach where you would work through 706 and you
could actually marry rule of reason with a presumption. So you
could say, at the outset, that prioritization is presumed lawful, but
you place a fairly small burden on websites or edge providers to
show that there’s a harm to them, and at that point the burden
would shift to the broadband providers to defend themselves. And
that gets you a way of screening out frivolous complaints, without
making it so difficult for edge companies, especially small
companies, to raise their concerns. That’s something that could be
done under Section 706. It’s something that’s very consistent with
where the Supreme Court came out in the Activist decision, or the
Ninth Circuit came out recently in another decision.
What do you say to that? Are you open to such an approach,
and, if so, why do we need Title II? Why can’t we do that under
706?
GENE KIMMELMAN: We said from the outset that the
commission should look to use all its tools and figure out what the
best ones were, and that includes Section 706. I think there are
some interesting things that could be done with 706. There are
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also some things that could be way overreaching that would be
much more regulatory than I think any of us would like, so one
has to be a bit careful there.
My great concern is the history of the FCC in doing case-bycase analysis, which has been more in the media area, with
programming disputes. From my perspective it’s been a pretty
dismal history—very slow-moving and contentious. And so it’s
implausible to do what you just described, Berin. But this is not
the way that the commission has functioned very well in the past.
One could use Title II and one could use certain 706 tools—one
could use a variety of tools. The critical thing is actually what
Commissioner O’Rielly said. We should be looking for something
that’s light-handed. This is a highly dynamic industry, a lot of
technological changes, a lot of things moving, as Chris’s charts
show, and I think one should be cautious whatever the tools are,
and do it carefully.
The question is whether you can come up with something
that balances the right forces, sends the right signals to the
marketplace, and actually avoids much regulatory intervention.
So I don’t know whether 706 tools, combined the way you just
described them, would actually work that way. I don’t think it’s
impossible but the history of the FCC in dealing with case-by-case
analysis is not a very good one.
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: But you do have
to have tools designed for the goals. I organized a panel in D.C.
about a month ago, in which Mark Cooper spoke, and he doesn’t
support Title II, even though he’s a strong network neutrality
proponent, because he said Title II would not stop paid
prioritization. Common carrier regimes permit multiple classes of
service that cost different amounts of money. So what I find odd
about the President’s announcement is that he said, “We need to
ban paid prioritization” at the same time he said that “we need to
do so through Title II.” Even if preventing paid prioritization was
your goal, it is not clear that Title II is the proper tool. I think that
there is some merit to prioritizing some traffic over other traffic.
For example, I personally would pay more for a better connection
from my home to my office, my e-mail server, and the other
handful of locations that I tend to visit to the most. That would
make my Internet connection more valuable to me. So I actually
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think that pay prioritization opens up new sources of consumer
value, because we value some connections more than others.
But set that aside. I didn’t quite see how Title II will
accomplish all of the President’s goals. I personally think Title I
and 706 have more potential to accomplish the goals that the
President set out.
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: Actually, I have a question
about paid prioritization. The big edge players can already buy
better delivery service through content delivery networks, like
Akamai. Thus, the idea that right now everything is exactly the
same and everyone on the edge has the same route and speed
through the network, I don’t even think is true right now. So I’m
uncertain of why we’re acting as if that’s the case right now and
we want to keep it that way.
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: The Internet is a
network of networks, and people often forget what that means. If
you look at the routing tables, there are 47,000 different
autonomous systems that make up the Internet, and they mostly
interconnect with each other through arm’s length negotiations for
different levels of investment and capacity. The idea that two bits
coming to the same place from similar sources would pay the same
amount and take the same amount of time blinks reality. Any
attempt by regulators to equalize all of those differences will
inevitably lead to fairly comprehensive regulation of
interconnection disputes. Moreover, if the regulators set one price
too low, traffic is going to flood through the mispriced link. In a
normal market, the natural response would be to increase the
price until demand equals supply. You cannot do that, however, if
prices are regulated.
Commissioner Ohlhausen’s comments also underscores that
the Internet’s topology is endogenous. The interconnection price is
the last of a long series of decisions. Firms weigh the cost of
interconnection against the cost of alternatives, such as employing
a CDN or negotiating a direct connection instead indirect
connections. Once one recognizes the full range of options open to
a party negotiating an interconnection agreement, it becomes a
much richer space. Focusing on the price paid is too narrow. I
understand that one side of the bargain would like to pay as little
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as possible, while the other side would like to pay as much as
possible. Those who see a short-term advantage in government
adjudication of prices may later find that the tables have turned.
JUDGE STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS: We can’t speak simply
of a quick system because obviously anything could happen and
what’s happening now is a mixture of systems. But I guess you
still could pose the question of whether the focus on competition or
the focus on regulation, which of them, as a practical, institutional
matter, invites more rent-seeking than the other, and to what
extent can one work out trade-offs between the two systems,
which minimize rent-seeking? I would be interested in anyone’s
reflections on that.
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: Looking at public choice
theory, when you think about an agency like the Federal Trade
Commission or the Department of Justice, which are not industryspecific regulators, typically they’re harder to capture. Who is
going to invest the resources to capture them, when such agencies
only look at your conduct and your deals every now and then? By
comparison, I think when you have an industry-specific regulator
which is making a lot of decisions about a very discrete set of
players, the incentive to engage in rent-seeking tilts the playing
field in your favor, and raise your rivals’ costs, I think is probably
a lot more beneficial a strategy for a company to engage in.
JUDGE STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS: Gene, did you want to
say something?
GENE KIMMELMAN: From a perspective of captured
agency concerns I can fully understand that. From a perspective of
expertise, I can just say that as much as I think the Department
of Justice Antitrust Division lawyers and economists are brilliant,
they often feel like they have to defer to FCC expertise in certain
areas, because they do so much in so many realms that they can’t
necessarily keep up with the details. I think, also, it’s not just
rent-seeking in a traditional analysis. It’s a whole ecosystem. So if
I get away from the Windows update example, but I get into a
question of consumer inconvenience and problems of
interoperability, those are things that are not very good antitrust
issues, often. They’re not pure market foreclosures. It doesn’t have
to be a monopolist or a dominant player, but it can be an
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enormous drag on the economy and harm to consumers that is
short of an antitrust violation.
But if you have an expert agency that has a mandate to look
at that, you might be able to deal with that problem and actually
augment competition. It’s not necessarily an antitrust issue. So
there are different issues that need to be addressed in this
competitive analysis. And then, in this example you used of paid
prioritization, you just mix interconnection and paid prioritization
and, frankly, I don’t know what the President meant, but even
with what the President said, all of the interconnection companies
don’t think it addressed their issues of what they’re paying for
CDNs or direct transit or direct connection. So you have to look at
a broader picture of this because it’s a very complicated
infrastructure issue. You have to look at what would be equal and
what wouldn’t be equal. My sense is many of the things you
described, Chris, would not be touched as requiring equal
payment or treatment. It’s a much narrower set of issues where
there’s a terminating monopoly problem that at least will need to
be looked at, with the President weighing in with one particular
approach.
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: I think Gene is
absolutely right. There are issues with which the FCC deals that
are not competition issues. The one that I think is the most
important right now is spectrum policy. That is an allocation
decision that involves fighting with the Department of Defense
and working to get more spectrum into play. I think allocating
more spectrum to broadband is in the best interest of the country,
and I think I hope the FCC can spend more time focusing on that.
MICHAEL O’RIELLY: It’s an option if you want to play.
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: Yeah, absolutely.
I’ve got a little change in my pockets. Let’s see what we can do.
[Laughter.]

PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: I also note that
Europe once held aspiration of abolishing telecommunications
regulation and relying entirely on competition policy. Their hope
was that once markets became sufficiently competitive, sector-
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specific regulation would disappear. European policymakers no
longer regard that as a realistic outcome any time soon. It may
happen someday that we can rely exclusively on competition
policy, but no one is expecting it to happen soon.
JUDGE STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS: Let me just interrupt
please. Why have the Europeans given up on sector-specific
regulation?
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: The European
telecommunications sector faces many challenges. National
governments still own major stakes in incumbent telephone
companies, such as Deutsche Telekom, Orange, and Telia Sonera,
and they have shown little real interest in further privatization.
The problem is exemplified by Europe’s ongoing discussions about
the need for a digital single market. Despite the rhetoric, they do
not seem to want a single market because of the pressure it would
place on many domestic companies that are not globally
competitive. A good example of the challenges of creating a single
market is the merger of East and West Germany. A large number
of companies in East Germany that were unable to compete with
West German companies went bankrupt, which in turn caused a
great deal of unemployment and dislocation. Policymakers may
find the prospect of something similar happening in their
countries to be quite daunting.
So a huge gap exists between what Europeans say constitutes
valid competition policy and what they actually do. Part of the
reluctance to embrace competition stems from political concerns of
not wanting to endure major dislocations. Part of it stems from the
fact that governments with ownership stakes in European
telecommunications companies derive real value from shielding
those companies from competition. I was talking to a major figure
in the German national regulatory agency. She explained that
although institutional barriers existed designed to prevent those
in charge of triose investments from exercising any influence over
regulatory policy, she acknowledged that the government does
enjoy the regular dividend that it receives from that investment.
Increasing competition would place that revenue stream and that
investment in jeopardy.
The interconnection point is quite complicated. Netflix
recently changed network providers from Verizon to another
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provider who had a peering arrangement with Comcast. Peering
agreements are barter arrangements that necessarily reflect some
notion of reciprocity. The complication is that Netflix represents
one-third of prime-time Internet traffic. When a company that
generates that amount of traffic changes providers, it is quite
likely that the new traffic flows from the new connection will no
longer comply with the reciprocity expectations. When traffic
becomes sufficiently asymmetrical, most peering contracts call for
the network generating excess traffic either to acquire more ports
or to begin making payments to compensate the other network for
the increased traffic that is out of balance. I think it is best to look
at Netflix’s decision as an endogenous choice. They used to be with
a network provider who had no trouble providing adequate service
because it was willing to pay additional compensation as Netflix’s
traffic grew. They switched to a cheaper provider that generally
refused to pay more in an attempt to make Comcast and other
similarly situated actors foot the bill. In short, they went looking
for a bargain and got burned. Now Netflix is negotiating direct
interconnection deals instead. The simple truth is that Netflix is
the single largest source of traffic on the Internet and is still
growing. The question is who is going to pay for the cost of
transmitting this additional traffic. While both actors wish the
other side will pay all of the costs, my instinct is that since both
sides derive value from the additional traffic, both sides should
bear some of the costs. The actual allocation between the two
parties should be the subject of negotiation.
There is a tendency to think edge providers are at the mercy
of the network providers. David Clark of M.I.T., just by
coincidence, happened to be running trace route studies of the
connection between Netflix and Comcast in the days leading up to
their direct interconnection agreement. The data suggested that
Netflix had more ability to control how the traffic was handled
than did Comcast. Netflix appeared to shift its traffic among the
three transit providers connecting Comcast and Netflix on a dayto-day basis, with one transit provider being completely congested
one day and another one being completely congested on other
days. So both sides are fairly nimble here, and they are, in a lot of
ways, positioned to defend themselves.
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This is happening in real time. A regulator coming in to clean
up this mess after the fact is going to have a very, very hard time
doing that. These data suggest that the edge providers are not
simply at the mercy of the network providers. I think that both
sides are in an excellent position to bargain with one another. In
fact, edge providers and network providers are channel partners
that depend on each other to create value. They should find ways
to cooperate to maximize their joint business and agree to
allocation of the surplus that will hold for the long run. That is my
optimistic view. I don’t see a great reason for optimism in the
short run.
[Laughter.]

JUDGE STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS: I guess we’re
exhausted. I don’t see any hands up. All right. Will you join me in
thanking our panelists.
[Applause.]

